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The accuracy of Aristotle’s definition of place is defended in terms of his form-matter theory. This theory is in 
turn defended against the objectionable notion that it entails matter is ultimately characterless. 
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Problems with Place? 
Aristotle defines place as “the innermost motionless bound-
ary of what contains”. (Aristotle, 1952, Bekker, p. 212a20) “So 
when what is in a thing which is moved, is moved and changes 
its place, as a boat on a river, what contains plays the part of a 
vessel rather than that of place. Place, on the other hand, is that 
which is motionless; so it is rather the whole river that is plac-
ing, because as a whole it is motionless.” (Aristotle, 1952, 
Bekker, p. 212a15-20) But, this is arguably not without its dif-
ficulties. For, it seems to entail that “[f]irst, a ferry plying be-
tween the two banks will not change its place (it is always be-
tween the same banks). Secondly, two ferries between the same 
banks will be in the same place as each other. Thirdly, if the 
tide stops, the nearest immobile surface (and hence the place) 
will suddenly switch from being that of the banks to being that 
of the water in contact with the boat.” (Sorabji, 1988: pp. 
187-188) However, Aristotle is evidently seeking to define the 
whatness of place, not the whereness of it. This is because “in 
the river” answers the question “in what place?”, not the ques-
tion of “where in that place?” So, the latter might well refer to 
coordinates, as in terms of the banks and the river bed. Fur-
thermore, whether it is moving or not, water is the matter of the 
river; and according to Aristotle things are defined first and 
foremost not in terms their matter, but in terms of their form. 
Therefore, that the water is immobile does not mean that the 
boat can now be said to be simply “in the water”, because “the 
innermost motionless boundary of what contains”, is a river. 
Problems with Prime Matter? 
So, water is the matter of the river, but what is the matter of 
the matter? For, Aristotle contends the basic elements—earth, 
air, fire, and water—are not irreducible, holding as he does a 
theory of prime matter. Yet, this is also not without its difficul-
ties if—as it is not uncommonly accepted—this means that 
prime matter is featureless. Frank A. Lewis advances this inter-
pretation: “[prime] matter is not itself a kind of stuff or a kind 
of structure, in addition to the standard stuffs and struc-
tures—fire, flesh, flesh-and-bones—found among changeable 
objects. Rather, we can usefully think of matter, in the standard 
case, in terms of the property the standard stuffs or structures 
of the changeable world must have in order to count as mat-
ter…what counts as prime matter is not any kind of stuff or 
structure at all—it has no features of its own, beyond that it is 
matter and, hence, that it is capable of receiving contraries in 
generation and destruction …” (Lewis, 2008: p. 133) But, how 
can something be thought of at all, without its being considered 
to have some features of its own? For example, when we are 
thinking of the matter of vapors, drops, puddles, ponds—and 
rivers—we are thinking of water, which is a certain kind of 
liquid. Therefore, the idea of something completely character-
less seems to be absurd. 
Aristotle and Prime Matter 
It is fortunate, then, that this account of prime matter turns 
out in fact to dubiously be Aristotle’s. For, he says that the 
apparently simple bodies of which all things are made—Earth, 
Air, Fire, and Water—are in fact “not simple, but blended. The 
‘simple’ bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not 
identical with them.” (Aristotle, 1952, Bekker, p. 330b23-25) 
And, in answer to the question of whether the matter of these 
elements —Earth, Air, Fire, and Water—is the same, Aristotle 
suggests that “[p]erhaps the solution is that their matter is in 
one sense the same, but in another sense different. For that 
which underlies them, whatever its nature may be qua underly-
ing them, is the same: but its actual being is not the same.” 
(Aristotle, 1952, Bekker, p. 319b [emphasis added]) That is, 
what this basic material is, “is [that which is] ‘such-as-fire’” 
and [that which is] ‘such-as-air’; and so on with the rest of 
them.” (Aristotle, 1952, Bekker, p. 330b24) Yet, it has “no 
separate existence, but is always bound up with a contrariety” 
—namely, it is as Earth, Air, Fire, or Water. (Aristotle, 1952, 
Bekker, p. 329a26) Hence, what he means is that the same basic 
material can present to us in different ways. For example, sup-
pose that prime matter were bronze. Bronze, then, would be 
that which is such-as-earth, and such-as-air, and so-on. Hence, 
the basic material—bronze —would be that which, as it exists, 
does so in modified ways. 
Defining Prime Matter 
Aristotle says elsewhere that “my definition of matter is just 
this—the primary substratum of each thing, from which it 
comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the 
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result.” (Aristotle, 1952, Bekker, p. 192a32-33) For, again, if 
the primary material were bronze, everything would basically 
be bronze. And, “matter comes to be and ceases to be in one 
sense, while in another it does not. As that which contains the 
privation, it ceases to be in its own nature, for what ceases to 
be—the privation—is contained within it. But as potentiality it 
does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside 
the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be.” (Aristotle, 1952, 
Bekker, p. 192a25-28) That is, as bronze in a certain way—for 
example, as earth—bronze can cease to be; but in itself in a 
world of bronze it cannot, because if it loses that modification, 
it will then just assume another. 
The Character of Prime Matter 
Therefore, it would appear to be wrong to attribute to Aris-
totle the doctrine that prime matter is featureless. For Aristotle, 
prime matter is the basic material of which everything is ulti-
mately made, since it is the material constitution of Earth, Air, 
Fire, and Water—as in the supposed case of bronze. This is 
because unless we posit such a material, how could the ele-
ments “come-to-be reciprocally out of one another, i.e. contrar-
ies out of contraries?” (Aristotle, 1952, Bekker, p. 319b) Now, 
Sheldon Cohen is a supporter the idea that prime matter must 
have a character; however, he then says that “[t]he common 
matter of the four elements is at various times hot, cold, dry, 
and moist; it is never characterless”; (Cohen, 1996: p. 59) as if 
hot, cold, dry, and moist constituted the features of prime mat-
ter. But, this surely cannot be right. For, according to Aristotle 
these are determinations of something; and it is something 
about which all we can say has the character of being unknown. 
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